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One day in the early 1980s, I was rid-
ing in the backseat of an old Land Rover
through the desert southwest of Khar-
toum. There was no road, but the land-
scape, mostly flat, was marked by the
occasional saint’s tomb distinctive to
Sudanese Islam. My companions and I
hadn’t seen another vehicle for a couple
of hours when one appeared as a tiny dot
on the horizon. It was headed our way,
and as is typical both cars slowed down
to see who else might be passing through
the seemingly empty desert. My curiosi-
ty was mild–I had been in the Sudan
only a month or two and didn’t think I’d
know anyone–until I realized that in
fact I did know the face looking back at
me through the window of the other
Land Rover. It was my friend Vaughan,
an Oxford classmate from years earlier.
We both shouted and our cars stopped.
The reunion was a pleasure. It seemed
very old-school, and we laughed about
how many Oxford classmates of differ-
ent generations had run into each oth-
er in the Sudan over the last 150 years.
More than a few, I’m sure, each taking
pleasure in his or her cosmopolitanism
(and more than a few in colonialism,
too).
Vaughan and I caught up on families
and careers and work on multiple conti-
nents. Being citizens of the world was
going well for both of us. Vaughan was
an attorney by the time of our reconnec-
tion, working for Chevron, which was
developing oil ½elds near Bentiu in the
Southern Sudan. A university professor
supported by the Kellogg Foundation, I
had come to Sudan on the heels of trav-
eling through China and was teaching 
at the University of Khartoum while my
wife Pam worked for the U.S. State De-
partment’s Of½ce of Refugee Affairs.
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She would go on to a career in the Unit-
ed Nations. Vaughan’s wife Mary be-
came a photographer and founded a sup-
port group for expatriates.
Our little group exempli½ed much of
the cosmopolitanism that was sweep-
ing up a wide variety of young profes-
sionals and activists in a global network
of relief work, diplomacy, corporate in-
vestments, journalism, and advocacy.
“Small world!” at least one of us ex-
claimed tritely. Indeed it is for those
equipped to navigate as we were. I’m
sure it didn’t seem small in the same 
way for the Eritrean refugees seeking
shelter in Sudan from ½ghting to the 
east or, in some cases, being resettled 
in Europe or America.
Eritreans who settled in the United
States also found old friends, sometimes
former comrades in arms and often dis-
tant relatives: they, too, inhabited a
global world. In fact the Eritreans suc-
cessful in navigating the maze of inter-
national organizations and national gov-
ernments to reach Europe or the United
States were generally the more cosmo-
politan among the migrants. They knew
of far-flung events and appreciated cul-
tural difference; they were more educat-
ed than their fellow nationals; they had
more experience with cities and com-
plex organizations. But they were less
prone than the Western aid workers 
they met to think of globalization as a
matter of nations fading into a border-
less world. The refugees made connec-
tions across long distances, but they rec-
ognized these as particular, speci½c con-
nections and didn’t confuse them for
unambiguous tokens of a universalistic
type: global connections.
Common approaches to the idea of
cosmopolitanism encourage people like
Vaughan and me to confuse the privi-
leged speci½city of our mobility for uni-
versality. It is easy for the privileged to
imagine that their experience of global
mobility and connection is available to
all, if only everyone would “be” cosmo-
politan. We need continually to remind
ourselves of the extent to which felt cos-
mopolitanism depends on privilege. As
Anthony Appiah suggests, “Celebrations
of the ‘cosmopolitan’ can suggest an 
unpleasant posture of superiority to-
wards the putative provincial.”1 In oth-
er words, the genuinely attractive eth-
ical orientation toward a common hu-
man community of fate can be under-
mined by an unattractive self-congratu-
lation and lack of self-critical awareness
of privilege.
Cosmopolitanism is in fashion. The
trend started in the 1990s, after the end
of the cold war and amid intensifying
globalization. Cosmopolitan is now 
a compliment for the suave in a way it
hadn’t been since the 1920s or at least
the 1960s, when in cold war spirit spies
epitomized the cosmopolitan. The Cos-
mopolitan is a popular drink, a vodka-
based cocktail, flavored with orange and
cranberry, made famous as the favorite
drink of the girls on tv’s Sex and the
City.2 Those self-styled girls didn’t show
much interest in the political philosophy
1  Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism (New
York: Norton, 2006), xiii. 
2  One of the several bartenders with claims to
have invented the Cosmopolitan, Toby Ceccini
of the Odeon in New York’s Tribeca, entitled
his autobiography Cosmopolitan: A Bartender’s
Story (New York: Broadway, 2004)–and the
pun is intentional. Tribeca is the New York
neighborhood most identi½ed with the 1990s
boom, but the boom was, in general, identi-
½ed with the Silicon Valley–apt then that the
blogging consensus gives San Francisco the
strongest claim on inventing the drink of the
decade. But only in New York did the relevant
bartender write his autobiography. It was that
sort of decade.
of globalization or Kantian ethics; they
were cultural descendants of Helen Gur-
ley Brown, who reinvented Cosmopolitan
magazine in the 1960s.
Now, as then, cosmopolitanism lives 
a double life as a pop cultural evocation
of openness to a larger world and a more
systematic and academic claim about 
the moral signi½cance of transcending
the local, even achieving the universal.
Both have flourished, especially in good
times and amid optimism about global-
ization. (Cosmo, as the magazine came 
to be called, was founded in 1886, riding
the wave of a stock market boom not
unlike those of the 1920s and the 1990s.)
Cosmopolitanism, though, is not
merely a matter of cocktails or market
ebbs and flows. It’s what we praise in
those who read novelists from every
continent, or in the audiences and per-
formers of world music; it’s the aspira-
tion of advocates for global justice and
the claim of managers of multinational
businesses. Campaigners on behalf of
migrants urge cosmopolitan legal re-
forms out of both concern for immi-
grants and belief that openness to peo-
ple from other cultures enriches their
countries. Cosmopolitan is the ½rst cat-
egory in the advertisements posted by
would-be husbands seeking brides (and
vice versa) in the Sunday Times of India.3
These different usages reinforce the
fashion for the concept but muddy its
meaning. Cosmopolitan can be claimed
for a political project: building partici-
patory institutions adequate to contem-
porary global integration, especially out-
side the nation-state framework. Some-
times it is claimed for an ethical orienta-
tion of individuals–each should think
and act with strong concern for all hu-
manity–at yet other times it is claimed
for a stylistic capacity to incorporate
diverse influences or for a psychological
capacity to feel at ease amid difference
and appreciate diversity. Used some-
times for all projects that reach beyond
the local (with some slippage depending
on whether the local means the village or
the nation-state), it is used other times
for strongly holistic visions of global
totality, like the notion of a community
of risk imposed by potential for nuclear
or environmental disaster. Cosmopoli-
tan can also describe cities or whole
countries. New York or London, con-
temporary Delhi or historical Alexandria
gain their vitality and character not from
the similarities of their residents but
from the concrete ways in which they
have learned to interact across lines of
ethnic, religious, national, linguistic, and
other identities. 
Britain was a center of the 1990s boom
in talk of cosmopolitanism. This was a
period of renewal in the cultural and ½-
nancial life of British cities, with yup-
pies, art galleries, and startling improve-
ment in restaurants, and reference to
“cosmopolitan Britain” became stan-
dard speech–as in “cosmopolitan Brit-
ain has emerged as one of the word’s
most diverse and innovative food and
drink markets.”4 These references
evoked sophisticated, metropolitan cul-






3  While cosmopolitan is the ½rst category list-
ed, the ads go on for many pages, organized
also (for the less explicitly cosmopolitan) by
caste, community, language, religion, profes-
sion, and previous marital status. International
educational credentials are noted throughout,
but only in the cosmopolitan section are alli-
ances invited speci½cally in terms like “Cul-
tured, Cosmopolitan, Westernized” or “Smart,
Westernized, Cosmopolitan working for mnc.”
4  U.K. Ministry for Trade and Investment,
online at http://www.investoverseas.org/
United_Kingdom/UK_Sectors/Food_and_
Drink.htm. Examples can readily be multiplied
from almost any market imaginable: “With a
more cosmopolitan Britain driven by ‘lifestyle’
and ‘design’ home and garden television pro-






ture versus the non-cosmopolitan hin-
terlands, multicultural Britain versus
monocultural English, Scottish, or
Welsh national identity. More so, Brit-
ish cosmopolitanism evoked a positive
orientation toward European integra-
tion and engagement with the rest of 
the world. lse (the London School of
Economics and Political Science for
those without this cosmopolitan knowl-
edge) was academic headquarters for
this, with a range of intellectual ex-
changes and conferences, new master’s
programs focusing on ½elds like human
rights and ngomanagement, a clutch 
of international celebrity professors,
and, not coincidentally, fee-paying stu-
dents from all over the world. lse be-
came, in a sense, the ½rst really Euro-
pean university. 
Britain was especially well-placed to
embrace this cosmopolitanism because
English was increasingly the world lan-
guage, because it had joined the Euro-
pean Union without losing its special
relationship with the United States, be-
cause it was a major ½nancial center, 
and because its former empire gave it
unusually strong connections around 
the world. Britain remains a center of
cosmopolitan discourse. Consider Brit-
ish Airways’s rebranding as “a global,
caring company, more modern, more
open, more cosmopolitan, but proud to
be based in Britain”:
What is vital to this new identity is its in-
ternational feel. This is indicative of ba’s
desire to be a global player. Also, accord-
ing to ba, it shows Britain’s own multicul-
tural mix. However, the emphasis is on
presenting the positive aspects of differ-
ent cultures and how British Airways tru-
ly supports its operations, including its
many joint ventures, in different coun-
tries. All this leads to a positive image for
the 60 percent of ba customers who are
not British.5
But the message is not just for foreign-
ers. As British Airways’s branding con-
sultants point out, “The United King-
dom is not keen on being seen as the
country of outmoded traditions and 
old castles. The new surface shows a
youthful, cosmopolitan Britain, con½-
dently looking to the future.”6 Indeed,
this example of commercial cosmopol-
itanism comes on the heels of the late-
1990s rebranding of Britain itself as
“Cool Britannia.” New Labour was in
power, but hints of the mod ’60s and 
the once mighty empire were not acci-
dental. Britain was by no means unique;
nation-branding flourished around the
world with nearly every nation claiming
to be cosmopolitan but with distinctive
arts and culture and delightful local
scenery.7
In both popular culture and political
science, cosmopolitanism often ½gures
grammes . . . ” (http://hiddenwires.co.uk/
resourcesarticles2004/articles20040503-
05.html). In Britain, as elsewhere, though, 
the years after 2001 marked a change. “Sud-
denly the celebration of postnational, cosmo-
politan Britain has been eclipsed by the re-
turn of ‘security and identity’ issues,” as
David Goodheart put it in 2006 (http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story
_id=3445).
5  Bob Ayling (Chief Executive Of½cer, Brit-
ish Airways), in British Airways News, June 10,
1997; see also http://www.euran.com/BC
/art&BritishAirways.htm (accessed April 7,
2007). 
6  See http://www.jyanet.com/cap/0614fe1
.htm (accessed January 15, 2007).
7  See Melissa Aronczyk, “Nations, New and
Improved: Branding National Identity,” in C.
Calhoun and R. Sennett, eds., Practicing Culture
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2007).






as an attitude, a style, a personal com-
mitment; this is not necessarily politi-
cal or even ethical. Contrast the signif-
icance of the phrases “citizen of the
world” and “man of the world.” The 
latter is as likely to be about expanded
tolerance for ethical lapses–or simply
about more fashionable clothes. Cos-
mopolitanism does signal a direct con-
nection between the individual and the
world as a whole.8 But if this is some-
times given ethical emphasis, equally of-
ten cosmopolitanism imagines a world
that is simply an object of consumption,
there for individuals’ pleasure. “The 
goal of cosmopolitanism is self-expres-
sion and self-realization,” writes Kim-
berly Yuracko. “Cosmopolitanism pre-
sents individuals with a wide range of
options; they choose the one that will
bring them the most pleasure and grat-
i½cation.”9
More commonly, being cosmopoli-
tan is glossed as being a “citizen of the
world.” Contemporary usage gives this
almost unambiguously positive valence
–who wouldn’t want to be a citizen of
the world?–but the idea can be terrify-
ing if what world citizenship means is
exclusion from citizenship and rights in
particular states: past demonizations of
“rootless cosmopolitans” shouldn’t be
forgotten. Complicating matters further,
positive and negative estimations of cos-
mopolitanism often coexist. For exam-
ple, there is no upper class in the world
more dedicated to cosmopolitan shop-
ping than that of Russia. But it is not just
ignorant rural Russian masses with min-
imal access to the new megamalls that
participate in xenophobic nationalism.
State elites and well-connected million-
aires press anti-cosmopolitan policies.
Even oligarchs who drive Bentleys and
have homes in the south of France are
complicit, though they may also become
objects of nationalist attack.
Consumerism versus ethics, or the co-
existence of stylistic cosmopolitanism
with political nationalism, isn’t the is-
sue. It is the tendency to substitute eth-
ics or style for deeper senses of politics.
Cosmopolitan typically suggests an atti-
tude or virtue that can be assumed with-
out change in basic political or econom-
ic structures, which are external to the
individual. Much of the appeal comes
from the notion that cosmopolitanism
(a version of ethical goodness) can be
achieved without such deeper change–
a key problem in an otherwise attractive
concept.
Cosmopolitanism should not be sim-
ply a free-floating cultural taste, person-
al attitude, or ethical choice; it must be a
matter of institutions. What seems like
free individual choice is often made pos-
sible by capital–social and cultural, as
well as economic. Take Singapore’s pres-
ident, who spoke of that island’s “cos-
mopolitans” and “heartlanders.” After
the speech, a local blogger posted mock
advice on how to be a cosmopolitan:
“Many Heartlanders think that to be-
come a Cosmo, you need a lot of money.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
Being a Cosmo is essentially a state of
mind, and has nothing to do with that
overdraft that keeps you awake at
8  In this, as in other ways, cosmopolitanism
echoes rather than transcends nationalism,
emphasizing direct connection rather than
institutional mediation; see Calhoun, Nation-
alism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1997). There are exceptions, including
efforts to understand cosmopolitanism from
within various scales of relationships across
lines of difference rather than categorical sim-
ilarity on a global scale. See Sheldon Pollock,
“Cosmopolitan and Vernacular in History,”
Public Culture 12 (3) (2000): 591–625.
9  Kimberly Yuracko, Perfectionism and Contem-
porary Feminist Values (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2003), 91.






night.”10 He continues with advice on
wine and watches, cars and condos. But,
as he says, “Travel is the true measure of
a Cosmo. ‘Been there, done that’ is their
motto.” Sadly, his readership is “those of
us who haven’t been, primarily because
we haven’t a bean.”
The class consciousness of frequent
travelers involves not only privilege, but
the illusion that our experience of diver-
sity and mobility reveals the world as a
whole.11 I have met my friend driving
through the Sudanese desert. I have
friends around the world. I have traveled
on every continent. I feel at home in
cities (and hotels and airports) I have
never before visited. I drive a foreign car
and happily eat food from widely vary-
ing cuisines. I care about distant victims
of disasters and injustices. The world
seems small. Yet none of this makes the
world a whole or reveals it to anyone in
that wholeness.
The dominant strands of cosmopoli-
tan theorizing draw heavily on the expe-
rience of frequent travelers like Vaughan
and me, moving freely across borders
and, sometimes, creating expatriate
communities where businesspeople, aca-
demics, and aid workers of several na-
tionalities mix in once-imperial cities.
The theories do at times make reference
to less privileged border-crossers: Boli-
vian musicians who play on street cor-
ners around Europe, Filipina housekeep-
ers who serve locals and expatriates alike
in Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf,
Sikhs who drive taxis in Toronto and
New York, Mexicans who migrate to
Spain and the United States. These mi-
grants are certainly sources of multicul-
tural diversity and global connections.
They may be cosmopolitans in the sense
of having loyalties that cross borders,
but they do not exemplify the abstract
universalism of much cosmopolitan the-
ory. Migrant experience seldom reflects
the privilege of, say, Anthony Appiah’s
account of how ties he made in his fa-
ther’s royal compound and later private
schools remain active through friends
and relatives who have moved to sever-
al countries. For that reason, it seldom
supports a synoptic view of the world as
a whole as distinct from multiple partic-
ular connections. Cosmopolitan theo-
ries need to be supplemented by empha-
sis on the material conditions and so-
cial institutions that make this sort of
cosmopolitan inhabitation of the world
possible–and much more likely for
some than others.
Webs of speci½c connections position
us in the world, from friendship and kin-
ship through national states or religions
to markets and global institutions. These
make possible meetings like mine in the
desert, even though it is more typical to
equate cosmopolitanism with either a
personal style or with universalistic eth-
ical commitments. Navigating beyond
one’s state is largely the product of par-
ticular networks of ties, material resour-
ces like credit cards, and the support
provided to individuals by states, such 
as the issuing of passports. It is not by 
a relationship to any encompassing in-
stitution that de½nes belonging to the
world as a whole. Though there are
growing institutions and private agree-
ments for global governance–for po-
licing, regulation of the Internet, arbi-
tration of contract disputes–most of
these do not offer “citizens” opportuni-
10  Mahesh Krishnaswamy, http://mahesh.
sulekha.com/blog/post/2000/06/how-to-be-
cosmopolitan.htm. 
11  Craig Calhoun, “The Class Consciousness of
Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actu-
ally Existing Cosmopolitanism,” South Atlantic
Quarterly 101 (4) (2003): 869–897.






ties either to participate politically or to
make claims in the ways that different
states do.
When cosmopolitans are described as
“citizens of the world” this is clearly not
directly analogous to citizenship of a
state–and in fact may be a more inferi-
or or less protected type of citizenship.
Not all states offer very much chance for
participation or response to claims, but
most do offer some. They offer a struc-
ture in which individuals are recognized
to belong and gain certain entitlements.
Citizens may ½ght to extend their rights
and improve their states. Many individ-
uals are denied full rights, and not all are
recognized and empowered as citizens
–precisely the exception that proves the
value of the rule: to be stateless is not a
happy circumstance. 
If cosmopolitans are citizens of the
world, we have not only to ask what 
kind of polity this world is (if it is any)
but what makes this cosmos whole. Di-
vine creation would be a possible an-
swer; the world is whole by virtue of its
single maker. Likewise, we could derive
unity from the notion of the tao existing
before the differentiation of the world 
as we know it. Or we could follow “deep
ecology” in focusing on nature itself as
creator not creation, as sacred and be-
yond the human. 
None of these is what most self-de-
clared cosmopolitans mean when they
use the term. Most mean something like
the abstract equivalence, or at least
equal value, of human beings consider-
ed as individual tokens of a global type:
humanity. This understanding under-
writes most philosophical accounts of
ethical universalism and is the basis
–explicit or implicit–for much cosmo-
politanism.12 But categorical equiva-
lence among all human beings describes
only an abstract whole, not the more
complicated and heterogeneous world in
which human beings differ for cultural
and other reasons, claim identities, and
forge solidarities and enmities. There is
nothing wrong with employing a logic of
universal equivalence, such as that of
Kantian ethics or human rights ideals, in
order to grasp the inequalities and other
injustices of the world. But this is one-
sided and needs to be complemented by
a cosmopolitanism oriented to the con-
nections that link people to each other in
several scales of solidarity and social and
cultural organization.
From the perspective of abstract
equivalence, essential similarities are 
the main ground for cosmopolitanism,
and differences tend to appear as poten-
tial problems: members of one religion
tolerate adherents to others–hardly a
source of cosmopolitan unity; nations
are often understood as only self-inter-
ested sectional loyalties; and strong cul-
tural loyalties often appear as prejudices.
Embracing global fashions and oppor-
tunities is good; however, it would be 
a mistake to imagine that embracing lo-
cal or national cultures and solidarities
instead was somehow a personal failing.
For thick or strong cultural loyalties 
not only join people to each other and
enable both individual and collective 
life but also, along with creativity, offer
variety to the world. The development 
of nations (and the social institutions
that organize national societies, includ-
ing, but not limited to, governmental
ones) is also a cosmopolitan achieve-
ment. Nations knit together smaller
12  For important and forceful recent state-
ments of cosmopolitanism as universalism, 
see Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) and
Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disabili-
ty, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).






regions and provinces, however imper-
fectly. And though religions divide hu-
man beings, religions also offer some 
of the largest-scale and most influential
forms of transnational, cosmopolitan
solidarity.
It, too, would be a mistake to under-
stand the wholeness of the world as al-
ready complete, based on the abstract
equivalence of human beings rather than
as an always incomplete but richly open
building of more and hopefully better
social connections. Connections allow
us to ground cosmopolitanism, instead
of in the categorical equivalence of hu-
man beings, in our relationships to each
other. Another answer lies in history and
the lateral connections human beings
create with each other–that is, the con-
nections among people and places (and
animals and plants and flowing waters)
are not those of divine creation or of fate
but, rather, products of human action in
history. In this view, humans are joined
not just by abstract equivalence but by
the interpersonal relationships and the
social institutions–from language to
states to religions–that we have creat-
ed. The capacity for such creation is ba-
sic to humanity.13
We are connected, but incompletely.
We have responsibilities because of our
connections, because we are affected by
and affect others, not only because of
abstract similarities. At the level of both
individuals and culture more broadly, we
are transformed by the historical pro-
cesses of interaction; these give us
capacities for mutual understanding.
These capacities are always in some de-
gree speci½c to the cultural and histori-
cal circumstances in which they are
forged; they are not simply universal.
We should not confuse the experience 
of roaming the world and appreciating
its constitutive differences with grasp-
ing it as a whole. This seems a more ro-
bust way to ground cosmopolitan think-
ing than the universalism of abstract 
categorical equivalence.
Today, markets may be the most wide-
spread of all historically made connec-
tions. Markets do not precisely coalesce
into a single global totality–the market
–except in ideology. They, too, link im-
perfectly and incompletely, just more
extensively and intensively than ever 
before. Even if certain aspects of mar-
kets approach complete abstract cate-
gorical equivalence–the reduction of
qualitative differences among goods to
mere monetary prices–markets are his-
torical connections. And insofar as we
are concerned with how human beings
around the world might be joined in a
cosmopolitan whole, we need to break
with the ideology of an abstract market
and see global markets–even those in
arcane derivatives and those managed 
in part by computerized trading pro-
grams–as relationships among actors:
people, places, institutions (including
states). 
We cosmopolitans, meeting in our 
various ostensibly empty deserts, may
sometimes link our sense of immediate
inhabitation of the world–our oyster!
–with a misleading notion of its univer-
sal accessibility. Moving among differ-
ent places, cosmopolitans feel that they
inhabit the world as a whole. But what, 
if anything, makes the world whole? In
asking this question, we confront the
limits of universalism and are forced to
take seriously the people whose lives are
13  See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
Arendt’s account of the creative capacity at the
heart of being human is inspired largely by an-
cient Greek thought. Christians and Jews may
also draw similar ideas from the biblical book
of Genesis, where creative potential is part of
what humans derive from being created in the
image of God.






constituted and constrained by their
ties to particular settings. Vaughan and
Mary and Pam and I were but weakly
connected to the Sudan. The Sudan was
the backdrop to our story; it provided
the terrain of difference that marked 
us as cosmopolitan. But we didn’t have
to be there, and the Sudan wasn’t real-
ly about us. 
Certainly, thinking in terms of the ab-
stract equivalence of human beings is
helpful–in theories of justice and hu-
man rights, for example. But cosmopol-
itanism shouldn’t be equated with such
universalism. Cosmopolitanism be-
comes richer and stronger if approach-
ed in terms of connections rather than
(or in addition to) equivalence. And 
cosmopolitans who think in terms of
connections–and their incomplete-
ness and partiality–are less likely to
turn a blind eye to the material inequal-
ities that shape the ways in which dif-
ferent people can belong to speci½c
groups while still inhabiting the world 
as a whole.
The Catholic Church has confronted
this issue in relating the universality of
Christian faith to the need for working
and living through particular groups. It
developed the notions of modalities (lo-
cality-based groups like parishes) and
sodalities (task-based groups like mis-
sionary organizations) to mediate the
universal faith. This way of thinking
about Christian ministry offers a re-
minder of more general importance: 
the organizations, networks, and path-
ways by which we transcend locality are
still particular, speci½c–to people, di-
mensions of human life, ways of bring-
ing some human beings closer rather
than others. Accordingly we need to pay
more attention to speci½c connections
–political and economic, as well as cul-
tural–among people that offer both sol-
idarity and encourage division.
Within a year of my meeting in the 
desert, the briefly latent civil war be-
tween Northern and Southern Sudan
would again become a devastating open
conflict. The Chevron oil ½elds would
become part of the stakes of the strug-
gle, and Chevron would be replaced by
other multinationals, with China even-
tually becoming the main customer for
Sudanese oil. And the oil trade wasn’t
the only multinational enterprise shap-
ing events in Sudan. Global Islam was
already important, and in the next twen-
ty years Sudan would undergo a revolu-
tion, a radicalization of Islamic politics,
and then a split between military and
religious leaders. Osama bin-Laden
would ½nd Khartoum a hospitable base
for a while, leading the United States 
to ½re missiles to destroy a factory pos-
sibly linked to international terrorism.
Not least, even as war died down in the
South, the Western Sudanese province
of Darfur would become nearly synony-
mous with the failure of global good in-
tentions faced with nasty government
and deeply complex local politics. 
In this same intervening period, as the
Soviet Union collapsed and capitalist
globalization intensi½ed, international
civil society became ever more promi-
nent. From religious charity to human
rights campaigns to regulating the Inter-
net, a range of organizations and net-
works worked across national bound-
aries. Versions of cosmopolitanism be-
came a natural self-understanding of
this work. This was not without ideolog-
ical distortions. Business leaders attend-
ing the World Economic Forum at Da-
vos and social movement activists at-
tending the World Social Forum in Porto
Allegre tended each to think they were
the real cosmopolitans. And both tended
to describe global civil society as more
autonomous from states than it really
was.






Precisely because the world is so in-
tensively connected today, cosmopoli-
tanism has become a crucial theme in
politics and social science, not only
ethics. But in an important way, these
different discourses are all embedded 
in a larger cultural cosmopolitanism 
that is, among other things, a sort of
class consciousness of frequent travel-
ers. Each of us, we might say, has a duty
to consider the implications of our ac-
tions for everyone. But thinking in terms
of a set or category of human individu-
als misses part of what makes cosmopol-
itanism a compelling concern today: the
extraordinary growth of connections
among human beings and variously or-
ganized social groups–relationships
mediated by markets and media, migra-
tions and infectious diseases, but none-
theless social relationships.
